Aristotle metaphysics pdf download

II with III suffers from a scope ambiguity. Is the claim that for each thing there is a single substance, its source, that it is identical with throughout? In this case the substance may be dust for man, milk for ice-cream and cotton for socks. Or is it that there is for all things a single substance, e. IV disambiguates in favour of the second reading. So material monism is strict in positing one material substance for all things. Finally, II makes a claim not just about the identity of the single substance with anything in the cosmos, it says that the single substance is identical in essence with it.

This would mean that when you define for any X what X is, you will give the definition of the single substance. For this reason also if and when anything comes to be or alters, the coming to be or alteration does not count as substantial change, because none of the attributes that define that thing will have changed or come to be. MM, then, allows for differentiation and change in the cosmos. Whether he is fine having dressed up for a symposium, or has learned music, as he did towards the end of his life, he remains the same substance, Socrates.

How does MM stand in terms of the four causes? When we are referring to this view as material monism we are ascribing the role of principle to matter of one sort. But what is included or excluded in terms of the four causes by so calling the principle is not clear at all.

Indeed, it is the issue at stake for Aristotle when he charges his predecessors with unclarity. First of all, Aristotle is not committing his monist predecessors to just having one notion of a cause, the material cause. He is committing them to positing one cause, the matter, as a principle.

As we shall see, Aristotle does attribute to the monists other causal factors than just material. Rather the material monists hold that a single material substance is the principle of all things. All beings derive then, directly or indirectly, from the causal properties of the single material substance as their principle. Because such a substratum persists, they think nothing really is gener- ated or destroyed. However, Aristotle reminds us sufficiently often that the material causes are discussed in the context of the claim that they are principles.

Their failure to unravel the application of the four causes in this basic area shows their muddleheadedness about the four causes in general. When any of the four causes works as a principle you also see its irreducibility to the other causes, and so also its distinctness as a certain kind of cause.

When we talk of matter as a cause, do we mean that there is some matter which is a cause in one or other of the recognized senses or do we mean more strictly that matter is a cause as what Aristotle would call a material cause? As we shall see, it is perfectly possible to talk about water as a cause but not as a material cause, for example, if one wants to talk about fire heating up something in a way Aristotle would recognize as efficient causation. We can refer to the matter as the single principle without implying, implausibly, that it is always a cause as a material cause.

They hit on something that is a cause but not the respect in which it is a cause, the qua-bit. Aristotle in Metaphysics I. But this is ambiguous between finding the cause in the class of things that are matter, like water, and locating it in the class of material cause amongst the four causes.

The distinction here is the same as the one Aristotle invokes in his discussion of the final cause: while Anaxagoras and Empedocles talk of Nous and Friendship as causes of good they do not show how they act for the sake of the good. So they do not act as final causes except by accident. He says in T3 that the matter is that from which all things are and which underlies the changes and affections. And one take on this is clearly as a material cause cf.

However, one cannot say that T3 unambiguously describes the matter in material causal terms. MM is not then a restrictive claim about the matter just being a material cause. In the same way too those who talk of the one or what is say that such nature is responsible for the substance, but not that it is or comes to be for the sake of this, so they end up some- how both saying and not saying that the good is a cause.

For they speak [of it] not in a simple way but by accident. The first two chapters have argued that the knowledge we are concerned with, wisdom, is not just knowledge of causes, or even principles broadly understood, but knowledge of first principles Metaph.

The discussion of causes is subservient to this aim. Hence Aristotle begins I. According to Aristotle, Thales believed in water as the principle of all things T4 — Metaph.

It makes no sense to think that water is just a material cause here, whether it is as supporting the earth or nourishing animals. Some acknowledgment of the efficient causal power of water must be assumed. But as we have seen, Aristotle is not in the business of accusing his predecessors of acknowledging only one cause.

Rather he takes them as not distinguishing them clearly and making some single matter the principle of all things. Thales can take water to be the principle while also thinking that water as water can have efficient and other causal functions. They say, meanwhile, that these differences are three: shape, order and position.

For they say that being differs only by form, mutual contact, and turning. Of these, form is shape, mutual contact is order and turning is position.

Concerning change, from where and how it belongs to the things that are, this these people too carelessly neglected, like the others. I take this to be another way of saying that, according to them, the under- lying substance generates the other things. There is, on the one hand, a something which comes into existence, and again b something which becomes that — the latter b in two senses, either the subject or the opposite.

What is intermediate seems preferable; for fire, earth, air, and water are already involved with pairs of contraries. There is, therefore, much to be said for those who make the underlying substance different from these four; of the rest, the next best choice is air, as presenting sensible differen- ces in a less degree than the others; and after air, water.

All, however, agree in this, that they differentiate their One by means of the contraries, such as density and rarity and more and less, which may of course be generalized, as has already been said into excess and defect. Air, water, earth and fire are material substances, and as such themselves composites in some sense of form and matter, though it is notoriously difficult for Aristotle to say just what the matter of the four simple bodies is.

But it is not in question that they are treat- ed by the earlier philosophers as substances with definite natures, and so for Aristotle having distinctive forms. As to what constitutes this form the simplest answer seems to be those opposite qualities that are typical for this kind of substance, hot and dry, say, in the case of fire.

However, while not making form a principle the material monists, like the atomists, are still free to use a range of formal differences in their preferred material substance to differentiate other things in the cosmos, for example, the four elements can be differen- tiated, as water, fire, air or earth, by their degree of density or heat. This point makes a difference when we turn to the question whether or not the mate- rial monists engaged with efficient causes.

The answer here is parallel to the answer just given about formal causes. Aristotle is not denying that the monists gave the underlying matter an efficient causal role. Moreover, the efficient causes are the same affections which we might consider the formal aspects of the material substance, dense and rare, hot and cold, etc.

So we stand within range of Aristotelian orthodoxy: agents of change act in virtue of possessing the form which they convey to the patient. Fire heats up what is cold because it is hot. Again, however, and this is the key point, we are not going beyond the attributes that the mate- rial substances have qua fire, water, air or earth.

Because the efficient attributes are just aspects of the underlying matter as such, they do not, I shall suggest, represent an efficient causal principle. The old physiologists, however, thought the opposite, because they did not see that the causes were numerous; they recognized only the material cause and the efficient cause and even these they did not clearly distinguish , whereas they paid no attention to the formal cause and the final cause.

Peck Aristotle does not mean himself to deny that there are contexts in which material and efficient cause work together. Indeed, he spends much of the rest of Generation of Animals V using this combination of causes to explain phenomena, such as variation in eye-colour. Preus and Anton is a three-pa t olle tio of pape s o A istotle s o tolog broadly construed. Aubenque, P. A tes du VIe S posiu A istoteli u.

The proceedings of the 6th Symposium Aristotelicum. Collects eleven papers in French, German and English, all devoted to the Metaphysics. Contributions cover a wide range of topics, including the manuscript tradition of the Metaphysics, the relationship between metaphysics and logic, bei g a d o e, the theo of su sta e a d A istotle s theolog.

Articles on Aristotle: 3, Metaphysics. London: Duckworth. A collection of twelve classic 20th-century papers o A istotle s etaphysical thought. Collects articles in English as well as English translations of French and German papers.

Pelletier, F. New Essays on Aristotle. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 Suppl. A collection of seven essays, many of which deal with metaphysical issues, with particular efe e e to A istotle s ie s o esse tialis , su sta e, i di iduatio a d ausatio. Preus, A. A collection of fourteen previously unpublished English papers o o tologi al a d etaph si al issues a oss A istotle s o pus.

Useful to get a sense of the debate. Scaltsas, T. Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Recommended for a philosophical audience. They contain papers on each of the chapters of the book under study, as well as comprehensive introductions and updated bibliographies. Centrone is a similar commentary-style collection of Italian papers on Book X, which also offers a new Italian translation of the book.

Hecquet-Devienne is a collection of French and English papers on Book IV, which also contains a critical edition and a French translation of the text by the volume editor. Horn is a recent collection of English paper on Book XII, more thematic in character but that still follows the general structure of the book. Rapp collects English and German papers on the so-called central books VII-IX of the Metaphysics and covers a wide range of issues elated to A istotle s otio of su sta e.

Crubellier et al. Centrone, B. Il libro Iota X della Metafisica di Aristotele. Sankt Augustine: Academia Verlag. A commentary-style collection of eight original essays in Italian on Book X, with a translation of the book and introduction by the editor.

Papers cover a number of important issues dealt with in Book IX, including unity, multiplicity, identity and contrariety. Also provides an up-to-date bibliography. Crubellier M. Autour de la puissance chez Aristote. Louvain: Peeters Publishers. A collection of eighteen previously unpublished papers in French and English on the notion of dunamis, ith pa ti ula ut ot e lusi e efe e e to A istotle s discussion in Met. Crubellier, M. Aristotle's Metaphysics Beta: Symposium Aristotelicum.

A commentary-style collection of nine papers on Book III of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle presents and discusses a series 14 according to the traditional numbering of philosophical puzzles or aporiae. The particularly useful introduction by the editor discusses general issues such as the nature and function of the aporiae as well as their place within the structure of the Metaphysics. Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum.

A commentary-style collection of eleven monographic papers on each individual chapter of Book XII two on Ch. A efe e e o k fo the stud of A istotle s theolog. F ede s i t odu tio to the olle tio is a fu da e tal o e ie of the st u ture, nature and contents of Book IX. Hecquet-Devienne, H.

Louvain- la-Neuce: Peeters. A two-part volume entirely devoted to Met. In the first part the volume editor presents a critical edition based on a fresh collection of the manuscripts and French translation of the text; the second part collects eleven studies ten in French and one in English on the most controversial aspects of Met.

Horn, C. New Essays. Boston and Berlin: De Gruyter. A collection of eleven new English essays on Book XII plus a useful introduction by the volume editor.

Although not in commentary format, it provides analysis of most chapters of Book XII and discusses a wide range of issues, including textual matters as well as aspects of the e eptio of A istotle s theology.

Rapp, C. Aristotele, Metaphysik. Berlin: De Gruyter. A useful collection of eleven not previously published German and English papers by internationally recognized scholars.

Covers most of the issues elated to A istotle s theo of su sta e, ith particular reference to Book VII.

Steel, C. Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium Aristotelicum. A commentary-style collection of eleven papers on the first book of the Metaphysics, a doxographic treatise where Aristotle reconstructs his predecessors views in light of his own theory of the four causes. Fundamental for any study of Met.

I as well as of pre-Aristotelian metaphysics. The appendix contains a new edition of Met. Gill is an extremely helpful paper, which discusses at some length the main strands in contemporary scholarship on the Metaphysics as well as a number of individual books and papers.

The International Aristotle Bibliography is an online subscription database collecting over 50, books, papers, reviews and dissertations on Aristotle. A Selective Bibliography. Oxford: Sub- Faculty of Philosophy. Though obviously dated, this very selective bibliography is still a useful instrument for a first orientation. Intended for an English-speaking audience. Barnes, — An annotated bibliography on all the diffe e t a eas of A istotle s philosoph.

Citatio s a e o ga ized the ati all. Contains over e t ies o A istotle s Metaphysics. Gill, M. A istotle s Metaphysics Reconsidered. Journal of the History of Philosophy The paper provides a critical overview of the most recent strands in scholarship o A istotle s Metaphysics and discusses several individual contributions to the field. Excellent for a first overview of the literature. Radice, R, and Davies, R. This is the English version of an Italian bibliography published in as La Metafisica di Aristotele nel XX secolo: bibliografia ragionata e sistematica.

Milano: Vita e Pensiero. Compiled with the help of a large team of around fifty scholars, it is a complete, annotated bibliography of 20th-century up to studies, material a d i st u e ts o A istotle s Metaphysics. Especially useful for scholarly work. An online subscription database giving access to over 50, books, articles, e ie s a d disse tatio s o A istotle. Updated biannually. Metaphysics as a Science Books I-VI It seems clear that there is a science or discipline that Aristotle self-consciously theorizes about and practises in the fourteen treatises that have come down to us under the title Metaphysics.

Although this is ot A istotle s a of des i i g it, let us all su h a s ie e etaph si s isdo , theolog , fi st philosoph o si pl philosoph a e a o g A istotle s a s of ha a te izi g the dis ipli e he is after in the Metaphysics.

There are several issues that scholars have discussed in connection with metaphysics as a scientific discipline, but four have been particularly central to the debate. In Met. Commentators, therefore, have gone out of their way to understand what kind of unification Aristotle envisages for the different kinds of things that there are.

IV 3 Aristotle states that metaphysics should study the logical axioms and in IV. A istotle s defe e of PNC — the meaning, validity and extension of such defence — has been at the centre of a particularly heated debate. Although the four aforementioned issues are clearly connected and interrelated, it may be useful for ease of reference to discuss them separately under different headings.

The Subject-matter of Metaphysics In the Metaphysics Aristotle provides different and potentially conflicting accounts of the subject- matter of metaphysics, i. Two have been particularly important for the scholarly debate. On this account metaphysics is portrayed as general ontology: unlike the so-called special sciences, which all study a particular kind or genus of being, metaphysics is a general discipline, which is concerned with the totality of reality.

On this second account, metaphysics is not general ontology, but a form of rational theology: it does not study the totality of reality, but a particularly eminent kind of being, divine being.

Merlan offers a radically theological i te p etatio of A istotle s positio that basically denies that Aristotle ever conceived metaphysics as general ontology. More popular strategies have rather tried to reconcile the two different accounts of metaphysics by arguing that metaphysics is indeed general ontology, but also that the study of immaterial, divine substances holds a special place in the discipline.

Patzig originally published in and Frede exploit to this effe t A istotle s view in Met. Thus, the study of everything that is said to be ontology must have as its core part the study of what is said to be primarily theology.

Duarte is a detailed defence of an Aquinas-style solution: metaphysics studies being qua being, but theology is an essential part of metaphysics because divine substances are the causes of all other beings and so of everything else that there is.

Shields is a balanced and innovative reconsideration of the debate, which sets the problem of the subject-matter of metaphysics ithi the oade o te t of A istotle s ie o the atu e of ei g and its per se attributes. Duarte, S. Apeiron A Thomistic solution to the issue of the subject-matter of metaphysics. Argues that metaphysics studies indeed being qua being, but that theology is part of metaphysics because divine beings are the causes of all other beings: being is either an unmoved mover or is causally dependent on unmoved movers.

In Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Frede, A substantial refinement of the position in Patzig Solves the tension between ontology general metaphysics and theology special metaphysics by arguing that the way of being of non-sensible substances is the focal or core way of being in relation to which all other ways of being both the way of being of non-sensible substances and that of accidents should be understood.

The Monist — A classic, theological interpretation of the subject-matter of metaphysics. Patzig, G. Theolog a d O tolog i A istotle s Metaph si s. I Articles on Aristotle: 3, Metaphysics. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji, A seminal paper. Solves the issue of the subject-matter of metaphysics by applying to the relationship between sensible and non-sensible substances the focal structure of being Aristotle develops in Met. Originally published in German in as: Theologie u d o tolog i de Metaph sik des A istoteles.

Kant-Studien — Shields, C. Being qua Being. In The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Shields, An innovative reconsideration of the nature of metaphysics. Argues that the issue of the possibility Possibility Problem and subject-matter Extension Problem of metaphysics can be solved only when we understand what attributes belong per se to being Intension Problem. Ends up endorsing a solution similar to Duarte The Multivocity of Being Being, Aristotle claims, is said in many ways, as many as there are categories of being.

Let us call this doctrine the multivocity of being. This do t i e ust e u de stood i o ju tio ith A istotle s further claim in Met. Although the different kinds of being do not fall under one single genus, Aristotle is confident in Met. IV that they are enough unified to be studied by one single science. More particularly, although being is said in many ways, the different ways in which being is said depend on the way being as substance is said, and so it is the dependence of all categories on substance that guarantees the unity of metaphysics.

Following the seminal Owen , scholars describe the dependence of the other categories on substance as the doctrine of focal meaning. Owen argues for three important claims about focal meaning: that the focal meaning is a semantic doctrine about the different senses of the Greek expressions for being or what is; that focal meaning is a semantic structure intermediate between homonymy and synonymy; that the multivocity of being and the focal meaning are two different and incompatible doctrines, the former ep ese ti g a ea l stage i A istotle s thoughts a out ei g.

Irwin argues that the focal meaning is not a semantic structure, but an ontological relationship among essences — a view which has become prevalent in recent analyses of the focal meaning and is further developed in Lewis Irwin also understands focal meaning not as intermediate between homonymy and synonymy, but as a special case of homonymy.

Shields and Ward take a step further and offe a a al sis of ei g ithi ge e al studies of A istotle s otio of homonymy. Irwin, T. Homonymy in Aristotle. Review of Metaphysics — A survey of homonymy in Aristotle. Argues that the focal structure of being is a case of homonymy and is not intermediate between homonymy and synonymy. Against Owen understands the focal structure of being as a relationship among essences and not meanings. Lewis, F.

Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Addresses the objections raised in Shields against classifying being as a case of homonymy. Argues that solutions are available by conside i g A istotle s atu e t eat e t of the homonymy of substance in Met. Also provides a good overview of the debate to date. Loux, M. Aristotle on the Transcendentals.

Phronesis The best philosophical analysis of Aristotle s t eat e t of the t a s e de tals ei g a d o e. E a i es o e pa ti ula l A istotle s lai that ei g a d o e do ot o stitute ge e a a d the elated lai that the a e ot predicated univocally i. Owen, G. Edited by I. During and G. Owen, A seminal paper on Met. IV Understands A istotle s theo of being in semantic terms a d oi s the fo ula fo al ea i g to describe it.

Argues that focal meaning is intermediate between homonymy and synonymy. Makes also the influential claim that in the Metaphysics Aristotle reconsiders his early view that being is homonymous to make room for the possibility of a universal science of being. Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle.

The first monograph to study the homo of ei g i the ge e al o te t of A istotle s treatment of homonymy. Part I offers an in-depth analysis of the different kinds of homonymy in Aristotle and Part II considers its applications. Argues that Aristotle is mistaken in taking being as a genuine case of homonymy. Ward, J. Aristotle on Homonymy. Building on Shields , offers a concise and effective analysis of homonymy in Aristotle, with reference to its role in dialectic.

Yu, J. What is the Focal Meaning of Being in Aristotle? Argues that the following two Aristotelian claims are compatible: 1 being is said in as many ways as the categories; 2 being is said primarily of substance and secondarily of all other categories. Challenges the view in O e that is A istotle s ea l positio a d his fi al positio i the Metaphysics.

The method of metaphysics Scholars have long debated the issue of the method of metaphysics: what kind of science is metaphysics? How do metaphysical arguments proceed? There are mainly two polar options: metaphysics is a demonstrative science conforming to the model of science described by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics; metaphysics proceeds dialectically and not demonstratively.

Against the demonstrative character of metaphysics militates the requirement in the Posterior Analytics that the things a demonstrative science deals with should belong to one single genus. It follows that metaphysics cannot be a demonstrative science. Fraser is the most consistent attempt to overcome this difficulty.

For one thing, she argues that it is false that Aristotle requires that the things a demonstrative science deals with belong to one single genus. For another, she insists that the genus metaphysics studies is substance and not being. So, metaphysics studies substances and demonstrates that a number of properties belong to them.

Bell takes a less radical line and argues that, while metaphysics is deeply influenced by the Posterior Analytics demonstrative procedures, such procedures are significantly adapted to new aims and tasks. The general character of metaphysics invites the thought that it may have something in common with dialectic, which is equally general in scope. But the view that metaphysics is dialectical in character is problematic as well.

The main difficulty is that dialectical arguments have as their premises received or common opinions. Since there is no guarantee, in principle, that such opinions are true, it seems that dialectical conclusions are only probable and not definitely true. Aubenque is a classic defence of the view that metaphysics proceeds dialectically.

He fully takes on board the consequences of viewing metaphysical arguments as dialectical and argues that conclusions in metaphysics are only probable and provisional. Irwin is an influential attempt to come to terms with the dialectical character of metaphysics. While maintaining that metaphysics is not a demonstrative science, Irwin argues that it is not dialectical in the standard sense, either. Irwin distinguishes between pure dialectic and strong dialectic and argues that metaphysics is an instance of strong dialectic.

Pure dialectic is based on common and only probable opinions, while strong dialectic is based on those common opinions no one could seriously deny — and so its conclusions are not merely probable or provisional. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Although dated, this is still a classic and provocative a ou t of A istotle s app oa h to etaph si s. Argues that A istotle s ethod i the Metaphysics is fundamentally dialectical and not demonstrative, and so his arguments remain inconclusive, as dialectic is based on common and hence only probable opinions.

Bell, I. Metaphysics as an Aristotelian Science. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. An original e o side atio of A istotle s ethod i the Metaphysics. A sustained attempt to argue that metaphysics conforms, at least to some extent, to A istotle s odel of de o st ati e s ie e as described in the Posterior Analytics.

Bell contends that the Posterior Analytics model of scientific investigation is both endorsed and adapted to new tasks in the Metaphysics. Fraser, K. Demonstrative Science and the Science of Being qua Being. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy One of the most convincing attempts to defend the view that Aristotelian metaphysics is a demonstrative science. Makes two main claims: that substance is the subject genus of metaphysics and accidental predicates are proved to belong per se to substances; that it is false that, in a demonstrative science, all items the science deals with belongs to the same genus.

A remarkable examination of the epistemic status of A istotle s fi st p i iples i etaph si s a d ethi s. Argues that metaphysics proceeds neither demonstratively nor through pure dialectic which is based on common opinions , but through strong dialectic which is based on a select set of common opinions no one could seriously reject.

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